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Shakespeare vs. Aristotle:  
Anagnorisis, Repentance, and Acknowledgment 
 
Teaching Shakespeare to undergraduates, I have noticed 
that they seem to arrive already committed to a default 
notion of Shakespearean tragedy, a foundation which, 
howsoever dubious, seems to be of venerable age and 
provenance, and which often proves in the end unshakeable. 
Others seem to have noticed the same phenomenon: David 
Bromwich calls this default setting “a theory we are all 
taught sooner or later,” “usually sooner.” As a narrative, 
the account runs more or less as follows. The tragic hero 
has a tragic flaw. This moral vulnerability is profound but 
sharply limited, like a hairline fracture in an otherwise-
perfect diamond. It stems from, but is not reducible to, 
the idiosyncrasies of his temperament, as well as the 
contingencies of his context. Playing upon his judgment 
like a will-o’-the-wisp, this highly specific, individual 
weakness leads the tragic figure toward some preventable, 
understandable misstep, an error with unforeseen yet 
disastrous consequences, culminating in his own ignominious 
death. Just before he dies, however, in a sudden flash of 
insight, the protagonist realizes how and why he went 
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wrong, and he repents. “He discovers what happened to him,” 
Bromwich explains, “and learns how far his character is 
implicated in his fate.” Yielding to “reflection” and 
“remorse,” “the agent unmasks himself and is startled at 
what he finds.” This new understanding of himself, acquired 
at great cost, provides some final consolation to the 
audience: “some counterpoise of enlightenment.”1 We see 
ourselves writ large in the hero and learn to avoid his 
mistakes. As Rolf Soellner observes, “We have become fond 
of saying that Shakespeare’s tragic heroes are destroyed 
because they do not know themselves.” “Surely,” he adds, a 
“major reason” for the “popularity” of this account is “the 
indistinct hope that we can learn something from their 
failures.”2 
As a thumbnail sketch of Shakespearean tragedy, one 
could do worse. Problems arise, however, when students or 
other critics try to map this pattern onto Aristotle’s 
Poetics. What Aristotle means by hamartia is not what they 
mean by a “tragic flaw.” A better analogue would be what 
Calvin calls a “special sin,” or Alexander Pope, a “ruling 
passion.”3 Likewise, Shakespeareans’ appropriation of the 
term anagnorisis tends to be too expansive. When critics 
talk about anagnorisis in Shakespeare’s plays, the sort of 
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recognition they describe is not usually the kind of 
simple, instantaneous revelation Aristotle has in mind, an 
external identification of another person, but instead more 
typically a variation on the vivid accounts of internal 
metanoia [lit. afterthought, change of heart] which figure 
prominently and repeatedly throughout the New Testament.4 
What Aristotle is referring to is not any kind of holistic, 
heartfelt moral awakening, but instead much more matter-of-
fact: the kind of a “aha!” moment that might figure in a 
crime novel. The examples that he cites include, for 
instance, Euryclea in the Odyssey recognizing the stranger 
visiting Penelope as Odysseus when she sees the scar on his 
thigh (1454b25-8), or Orestes in Euripides’ Iphigenia in 
Tauris recognizing the queen who holds him captive as his 
sister Ipighenia when she dictates a message revealing her 
identity to his fellow prisoner Pylades (1455a18-22). 
Aristotle goes on to argue that some kinds of 
anagnorisis are better than others. “The least artistic 
kind,” albeit “the most common,” arises from “poverty [of 
imagination],” and works through “signs [and tokens]” such 
as Odysseus’s scar (1454b20-32) or other such “invented 
signs and amulets” (1455a24). The best kind comes about 
instead “from the events themselves, when the shock of 
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surprise arises from likely circumstances.” In the case of 
Euripides’ Iphigenia, for example, “naturally she wanted to 
send the message” (1455a18-22). As Kathy Eden points out, 
this contrast between different types of anagnorisis in the 
Poetics corresponds to the distinction between “signs” and 
“probability” as tools of forensic persuasion that 
Aristotle sets out in his Rhetoric. “The means of tragic 
recognition,” she explains, “coincide with the orator’s 
instruments of proof.”5 “In keeping with his evaluation of 
these proofs in the Rhetoric,” Aristotle prefers “the 
discovery which emerges as a consequence of the logical 
disposition of events over the one which relies on the 
spectacular effect of the simple sign or palpable proof.”6 
Eden’s alternative translation of anagnorisis as “tragic 
discovery,” rather than “recognition,” highlights this 
analogy to “legal discovery”: the disclosure of evidence in 
a court of law. 
 Something very closely akin to the kind of anagnorisis 
or “discovery” that Aristotle describes in his Poetics does 
occur in Shakespeare’s plays, but in a comic vein, rather 
than a tragic. In The Merchant of Venice, for example, when 
Portia and Nerissa return the rings that they gave to 
Bassanio and Gratiano back to them again, they reveal that 
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they were the ones who had played the parts of the “doctor 
of law,” Balthazar, and his clerk, in the arbitration of 
the dispute between Antonio and Shylock; they were the ones 
who took the rings, while they were in disguise, and they 
will not punish their new husbands, therefore, for giving 
the rings away. By far the most striking such moments, 
however, serve as resolutions to Shakespeare’s late 
romances. In The Winter’s Tale, Leontes discovers that his 
wife, Hermione, is not dead, as he thought, but standing 
before him, in the guise of what he initially believes is a 
statue. In his defense of “that very great play,” Pericles, 
in his second Edinburgh Lecture, Eliot argues that “the 
finest” of all such “recognition scenes” is Pericles’ 
reunion with his daughter, Marina, whom he had assumed was 
dead; the scene serves as the basis for his own earlier 
poem, “Marina.”7 “What seas what shores what grey rocks and 
what islands”? “What is this face”? Eliot’s lyric narrator 
asks. “My daughter.” The opening line echoes Pericles’s 
question to Marina: “What countrywoman? / Here of these 
shores?” (5.1.102-3). And the conclusion, too, repeats 
Pericles’s own: “O my daughter” (5.1.5), “my daughter” 
(5.1.35). The most complex such scene, however, is the 
conclusion to Cymbeline. As Piero Boitani observes, “this 
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extraordinary sequence brings all of the principal 
characters on stage.” “In order to untie all the knots of 
the plot,” Shakespeare’s rapid-fire, multipolar, tour de 
force anagnorisis “articulates itself over almost four 
hundred lines, entailing sixteen successive moments of 
revelation.”8 
 In his critique of what Charles Taylor calls “the 
politics of recognition,” Patchen Markell distinguishes 
between “recognition,” as Taylor and others use the term, 
and what Stanley Cavell describes in contrast as 
“acknowledgment.” “The source of relations of subordination 
lies not in the failure to recognize the identity of the 
other, but in the failure to acknowledge one’s own basic 
situation and circumstances.”9 That is to say, the primary 
problem with identity politics as it is usually pursued is 
not so much political resistance as it is the kind of 
identity that it presumes to exist and that it asks its 
adherents to demand each other recognize. It continues to 
invoke the “sovereign self” that it ostensibly aims to 
displace.10 “What’s acknowledged in an act of acknowledgment 
is not one’s own identity – at least, not as the politics 
of recognition conceives of identity: a coherent self-
description that can serve as the ground of agency, guiding 
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or determining what we are to do.” Instead, “acknowledgment 
is directed at the basic conditions of one’s own existence 
and activity, including, crucially, the limits of 
‘identity’ as a ground of action, limits which arise out of 
our constitutive vulnerability to the unpredictable 
reactions and responses of others.” Acknowledgment is, in 
brief, “an avowal of one’s own finitude.”11 
 Given that anagnorisis is often translated as 
“recognition,” Markell then asks what anagnorisis might 
have to do, if anything, with “acknowledgment,” as opposed 
to “recognition.”  Ancient Greek tragedy, he argues, 
clarifies the distinction that he draws between these 
terms. “From a tragic perspective, efforts to achieve 
sovereign agency are themselves ethically and politically 
problematic misrecognitions – not misrecognitions of the 
identity of the other, as that term usually implies, but 
failures to acknowledge key aspects of our own situation, 
including especially our own finitude in relation to the 
future.”12 Markell then reads Sophocles’ Antigone as a study 
in “the importance of human plurality as a source of 
vulnerability in human action.” “The fact of human freedom, 
which is the condition of possibility of effective agency, 
also limits our practical capabilities because it is not 
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exclusively ours but is mirrored in others.”13 Markell 
aligns Sophocles in this respect with Aristotle’s larger 
sense of human nature. As Martha Nussbaum demonstrates, 
Aristotle, too, has a keen sense of what she calls “the 
fragility of goodness.”14  
 Probably the master of this kind of anagnorisis-as-
acknowledgment is Jane Austen. Examples include Elizabeth 
Bennett’s discovery of the truth about Mr. Wickham in Pride 
and Prejudice, Marianne’s discovery of the truth about 
Willoughby in Sense and Sensibility, and Emma’s discovery 
of the truth about Frank Churchill in Emma. In each case, 
the character in question discovers, as Markell says, “our 
own finitude in relation to the future.” Shakespeare, 
however, seems to have a different end in mind. The purpose 
of the recognition scenes that characterize and conclude 
his late plays is above all theological. As T. S. Eliot 
explains, “The personages in Cymbeline, The Winter’s Tale, 
The Tempest, and Pericles are the work of a writer who has 
finally seen through the dramatic action of men into a 
spiritual action which transcends it.”15 Piero Boitani goes 
so far as to describe these last plays as “the New 
Testament of William Shakespeare.”16 The unlikely 
coincidences and supernatural events that allow unexpected 
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reunions to occur are not flaws, as George Bernard Shaw was 
wont to complain, but instead deliberate devices designed 
to foreground their significance as evidence of a 
benevolent divine providence, symbolized in Pericles by the 
music of the spheres. We are supposed to marvel at the 
supernatural order that guides the characters to their just 
reward and to welcome its manifestation, as we do at the 
miracles that we read about in the Gospels. “Pity and 
fear,” as Aristotle says, are a natural response to ancient 
Greek tragedy, given its assumptions about theology. 
Anagnorisis in Shakespeare’s late plays is designed in 
contrast to produce gratitude and peace of mind.  We are 
thankful, relieved, precisely because the Christian God, 
represented here symbolically, turns out to be so very 
different from Seneca’s indifferent, empty cosmos; 
Euripides’ cruel, vindictive gods; or the inscrutable, 
amoral, inexorable, impersonal fate that eventually 
destroys Sophocles’ Oedipus, despite his efforts to elude 
its grasp.17 
 Anagnorisis, then, as Aristotle uses the term, is not 
without its uses as a concept within Shakespeare studies. 
Problems tend to arise, however, when it is brought to bear 
on his tragedies, rather than his late plays. Here 
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anagnorisis has come to serve, in effect, as a euphemism: a 
secular alternative to the more obvious, more familiar, and 
more fitting Christian term, “repentance.” “The idea of a 
buildup in tragedy that moves toward a self-recognition has 
come to seem intuitively right,” Bromwich grants. “But 
where does the intuition come from?”18 The question is 
surprising, if only because the answer is so ready to hand: 
the abiding cultural influence of Christianity, even among 
those who do not think of themselves as sharing a Christian 
perspective. What we are looking for, whether we realize it 
or not, is a secular analogue of the Christian narrative of 
the conversion of a sinner. We want what preachers call a 
“road to Damascus” or “come to Jesus” moment: the 
transformation of the zealous persecutor, Saul, pitched off 
his horse, struck blind, healed, into St. Paul, the Apostle 
to the Gentiles. Northrop Frye, for instance, sees “the 
archetypal human tragedy” in “the story of Adam.” “The 
discovery or anagnorisis which comes at the end of the 
tragic plot is not simply the knowledge by the hero of what 
happened to him … but the recognition of the determined 
shape of the life he has created for himself, with an 
implicit comparison with the uncreated potential life he 
has forsaken.”19 Even given the recent “religious turn” in 
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Shakespeare scholarship, many critics, however, like 
Bromwich, still tend to be reluctant to concede that 
Shakespeare’s thought about ethics is inextricable from the 
influence of Christian theology. They appeal to Aristotle 
as a work-around, even at the cost of obscuring his 
original meaning.  
Further complicating the picture is the fact that 
metanoia [repentance] on the part of the protagonist, 
consistently mislabeled anagnorisis [discovery], does not 
always occur at the close of Shakespeare’s tragedies, at 
least not in any straightforward sense. The central figure 
does not always arrive at what Bromwich calls “self-
knowledge.” What exactly does Lear, for example, recognize 
about himself, in the end? When tragic heroes do repent, 
their repentance often seems to be somehow incomplete. 
Finally, and not least, the template of Shakespearean 
tragedy which I have outlined above leaves out a crucial 
piece of the puzzle. Repentance as Shakespeare sees it 
tends to be prompted, if at all, by a third and very 
different kind of “recognition”: the reciprocal process of 
intersubjective self-definition Hegel calls Anerkennung.20 
As he explains in his Phenomenology, “Self-consciousness 
exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so 
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exists for another; that is, it exists only in being 
acknowledged.”21 Put in plainer language, we come to know 
ourselves, to the extent that we ever do, by noticing and 
accepting how we are perceived by other people.  
This form of recognition, Anerkennung, has become 
familiar within Shakespeare studies through a related 
concept, the process Stanley Cavell calls 
“acknowledgment.”22 Cavell’s fascination with 
intersubjectivity emerges out of his engagement with the 
skeptical problem of knowing other minds. In response to 
Wittgenstein’s arguments against the possibility of a 
private language, Cavell asserts the possibility of what he 
calls “avoidance.” An individual can be aware of something, 
he maintains, and yet at the same time balk at that 
awareness, shy away from it, work around it, even within 
his or her own private thoughts. Knowledge is like a pool 
of water, in which any given insight can be either 
submerged or else brought up to the surface. Thus, some 
degree of skeptical solipsism is possible.  
According to Cavell, acknowledgment of discomfiting, 
humbling facts about ourselves cannot be accomplished 
alone, but instead requires us to engage with other people. 
“We must learn to reveal ourselves; to allow ourselves to 
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be seen.”23 Only then can we dredge up the truth about 
ourselves. As Patchen Markell explains, “to acknowledge 
another is in the first instance to respond to, to act in 
the light of, something about oneself; and conversely, the 
failure of acknowledgement, the ‘avoidance’ of the other, 
is crucially a distortion of one’s own self-relation, an 
avoidance of something unbearable about oneself.”24 This 
understanding of the role of the other in self-knowledge 
helps account for the Christian practice of confession, as 
well as its secular counterpart, psychoanalysis. As M. 
Scott Peck observes, in his psychiatric study of what he 
calls “people of the lie,” “the central defect of ‘the 
evil’ is not sin but the refusal to acknowledge it.” “At 
one and the same time ‘the evil’ are aware of their evil 
and desperately trying to avoid the awareness. We become 
evil by attempting to hide from ourselves.”25  
Why does Jesus call the devil “the father of lies” 
(John 8:44)? The devil “chose to live according to 
himself,” St. Augustine maintains, “when he did not remain 
in the truth, so that the lie he spoke had to do with 
himself, not with God.” The devil was “the first to lie, 
and the lie, like sin, began from him.”26 For St. Augustine, 
sin is “perversity and lack of order, that is, a turning 
Gray – 14 
 
away from the creator, who is more excellent, and a turning 
to the creatures, which are inferior.”27 As Paul Griffiths 
puts it, “Sin’s characteristic mark is self-serving 
aversion: sinners turn their faces away from God and 
attempt, narcissistically, to look only at themselves.”28 
One of St. Augustine’s favorite passages from Scripture is 
Sirach 10:13, which reads, in the Latin version known to 
him, initium omnis peccati est superbia [The origin of all 
sin is pride]. As St. Augustine explains, “The soul, 
delighting in its own power, slips away from the whole 
shared by all to the particular, which is private to 
itself. If it had followed God as guide it would have been 
able to be ideally governed by God’s laws along with all 
creatures. But by that apostate pride which is called the 
beginning of sin it wants something more than the whole and 
schemes to control it with its own law.”29 By its very 
nature, all sin is solipsistic, and for this reason, St. 
Augustine argues, “all sin is a lie.”30  
Why do the lies prompted by pride lead to a breakdown, 
then, in our relations with each other, as well as God? As 
St. Augustine observes, “the one who loves the sins against 
which he has been warned hates the light warning him and 
runs from it so that the actions he loves might not be 
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shown to be evil.”31 If we cannot escape such messengers, we 
sometimes turn to violence, like Shakespeare’s Cleopatra, 
when she almost kills the unfortunate slave who brings her 
the news that Antony has married Octavia. “The cause of 
tragedy,” Cavell concludes, “is that we would rather murder 
the world than permit it to expose us to change.”32 In 
Macbeth, for example, as Christopher Tilmouth observes, 
“conscience is mediated through real and imagined public 
gazes,” “a body of knowledge about the usurper’s shameful 
deeds” which other people “keep threatening to put 
Macbeth’s everyday self in mind of.” Like Lear, when he 
banishes first Cordelia, then Kent, Macbeth “strives to 
repel” this “oppressive knowledge,” rather than accept it, 
“by eliminating those in whom it is seemingly invested.”33  
“Evil” as Peck defines it means hurting others in 
order to preserve a pleasing notion of ourselves, one that 
we surmise might well be false, but that we are afraid, 
nonetheless, to abandon. “Why? What possesses them, drives 
them?” Peck asks. “Basically, it is fear. They are 
terrified that the pretense will break down and they will 
be exposed to the world and to themselves.”34 “The mother of 
cruelty,” as Montaigne says, turns out to be “cowardice.” 
Seen in this light, Cavell’s account of tragedy and the 
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Christian explanation of sin are remarkably similar. The 
root of the problem, in both cases, is self-deception, 
driven by a fear of shame. “To overcome knowing,” Cavell 
notes, “is a task Lear shares with Othello and Macbeth and 
Hamlet.”35 The plays in question end in tragedy because 
their protagonists are “unwilling,” as Peck says, “to 
suffer the discomfort of significant self-examination.”36 
They refuse to participate in what St. Augustine describes 
in more familiar, Christian terms as “confession.” 
The epicenter of debate about repentance in 
Shakespeare’s tragedies, under the guise of anagnorisis, is 
Othello’s final speech. Ernest Schanzer defines anagnorisis 
as “the realization of having, through one’s own blind 
folly, cut oneself off for ever from all that makes for 
joy” and cites this speech as a paradigmatic example. “The 
experience is undergone by Othello when he realizes that he 
has, with his own hands, killed the woman on whom all his 
happiness depended.” Other case studies Schanzer adduces 
include Lear, Macbeth, and Milton’s Satan. “It is this 
recognition which makes the Hell in the mind of Milton’s 
Satan burn so fiercely; which makes him, in his soliloquy 
on Mount Niphates, seek so desperately to lay the burden of 
blame on God.”37 Ruth Nevo describes “Othello’s 
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anagnorisis,” meaning, his “self-judgment,” as “utterly 
unexonerating.” “No court of law can fathom his case to its 
depths as he does.”38 
Much to the contrary, T. S. Eliot sees Othello’s 
repentance as inadequate. “What Othello seems to me to be 
doing in this speech,” he writes, “is cheering himself up. 
He is endeavoring to escape reality; he has ceased to think 
about Desdemona, and is thinking about himself.” Eliot sees 
similar instances of what he calls “bovarysme,” “the human 
will to see things as they are not,” in “the deaths of 
several of Shakespeare’s heroes,” including “notably” 
Coriolanus and Mark Antony, as well as Othello.  “Humility 
is the most difficult of all virtues to achieve; nothing 
dies harder than the desire to think well of oneself.”39 
Soellner concurs: “Othello’s conscious judgment of himself 
is defective.” “That Othello loved not wisely, one agrees; 
but that he loved too well is hardly true: surely the 
greatest kind of love is not one that leads to precipitous 
jealousy. When Othello calls himself ‘not easily jealous,’ 
he denies what in the course of little more than a day has 
taken place.” Nevertheless, Soellner objects, Eliot’s tone 
is too dismissive. Shakespeare’s “noble Moor” is not 
“merely a romantic liar”: “he appears to be intent on 
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telling his story aright.” The “dim and partial recognition 
of the truth” Shakespeare gives to Othello is 
“psychologically and dramatically appropriate,” given that 
he is still “in the grip of passion.”40  
A. D. Nuttall extends this kind of analysis to King 
Lear. “At the end of Othello,” he observes, “the hero is 
given a big speech having all the formal marks of ultimate 
anagnorisis but notably lacking the thing itself.” 
Likewise, he suggests, the Folio version of King Lear ends 
with a moment of “false anagnorisis.” “Lear is given what 
seems to be a moment of perception, a sudden intuition (of 
life in the dead child) – but an intuition which is wholly 
mistaken.” Shakespeare revises the Quarto version so that 
the “deeply moving moral anagnorisis” apparent “in the 
middle-to-later part of the play” is “erased at the end.”41 
Other critics such as Nevo and Soellner choose to emphasize 
Lear’s earlier moment of repentance: Nevo, for instance, 
marvels at “the simplicity and humility of the unadorned 
anagnorisis he has of himself.”42 When Lear “kneels and 
confesses to be a foolish, fond old man,” Soellner argues, 
this “visionary insight” is “accompanied by a new and true 
humility.” “For a moment, a precious moment, Lear knows – 
or, better, feels – who, what, and what manner of man he 
Gray – 19 
 
is. This is his anagnorisis.”43 Bromwich, however, moves in 
the opposite direction. What seems to be a change of heart, 
he maintains, is not as profound as it appears. Even in his 
final conversations with Cordelia, Lear does not arrive at 
“a moral understanding of good and evil.” He is “moved to 
see his errors,” but “he knows them only as rash judgments 
or wrong perceptions”; “he does not recognize in himself a 
character that was formed to make such ‘unconstant starts’ 
the pattern of his old age.”44 Cavell, too, is suspicious of 
Lear’s apparent repentance in this moment, seeing it not as 
a “correction” but instead a “repetition” of “his strategy 
in the first scene.” “He is anxious to go off to prison,” 
Cavell suggests, because “he cannot finally face the thing 
he has done”; “he cannot bear being seen.”45 
According to Bromwich, the “moral anagnorisis” Nuttall 
identifies in the “middle-to-later part of the play” and 
sees, like Soellner, as part of the resolution of King Lear 
is itself a “false anagnorisis.” In this sense, the tragedy 
is less like the story of Nebuchadnezzar in Daniel 4 and 
instead more like Shakespeare’s own Macbeth. Lear’s 
affectation of “stoical wisdom” in his speech, “Come, let’s 
away to prison,” is like Macbeth’s affection of nihilism in 
his speech, “To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow”: in 
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both cases, the protagonist is, as Eliot would say, 
“cheering himself up,” rather than acknowledging the full 
weight and consequence of his misdeeds. Bromwich notes that 
“Faulkner, Sartre, and other moderns” have admired 
Macbeth’s soliloquy for its supposed “universality.” 
Nevertheless, he insists, “it is an instance as fine as any 
in Shakespeare of the fitting of words to a particular 
character at a particular time.”46 Soellner, too, questions 
Macbeth’s claim that life is “a tale / Told by an idiot,” 
“signifying nothing” (5.2.25-27). “The utter impersonality 
of this most pessimistic passage in all Shakespeare marks 
it not as the poet’s ipse dixit, but as a dramatic 
expression of the price of self-loss”: “with the loss of 
his moral self, Macbeth has gained only a meaningless 
life.”47 Macbeth’s disingenuousness here, Bromwich suggests, 
is apparent in his tone: he seems “oddly satisfied” with 
his bleak pontifications. He consoles himself for his 
downfall by “framing his metaphysics so as to suppose that 
no one is much better off than himself.”48 
What then of Richard II? A. D. Nuttall maintains that 
“Richard II terminates, satisfyingly, in anagnorisis.” By 
the end of the play, he argues, “Richard has grown up, 
matured to the point of full anagnorisis, in the sense in 
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which that term applies to Sophocles’ Oedipus,” i.e., 
“self-understanding.”49 As a pattern of thorough-going 
repentance, Richard II seems prima facie an odd choice. 
Leontes in The Winter’s Tale or Posthumus in Cymbeline 
spring more immediately to mind.  But there is a parallel, 
nonetheless, to Othello which makes Richard a surprisingly 
apt counterpoint. T. S. Eliot’s criticism of Othello is 
more precisely that he adopts “an aesthetic rather than a 
moral attitude, dramatizing himself against his 
environment.”50 In Nuttall’s analysis, Richard makes the 
opposite choice. He relinquishes his “aesthetic” posturing, 
in the end, in favor of “moral” self-knowledge. Initially, 
Richard is “an evident fantasist,” “glassed in with words.” 
He turns “his own imminent fate” into “a story”: “it is as 
if he knows everything about his situation except the fact 
that it is actually happening to him.” “After the stripping 
away of his public identity,” however, “Richard’s verbal 
behavior changes.” His language “repents,” as it were, “of 
its own formalism.”51  
Othello returns in the end, despite all, to what G. 
Wilson Knight describes as “the Othello music.”52 Richard in 
contrast, over the course of the play, questions and 
perhaps, as Nuttall suggests, finally dismantles the 
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elaborate, highly-artificial manner of speech which at the 
beginning seems his most salient characteristic. Soellner, 
likewise, sees some measure of repentance, even if not the 
“full anagnorisis” Nuttall claims for Richard. Much like 
Lear when he says to Cordelia, “Come, let’s away to 
prison,” Richard “assumes a contemptus mundi attitude which 
is, at first, more of a posture than a conviction.”  This 
attitude, however, “gradually” becomes “increasingly 
sincere”; Richard “grows toward a limited self-awareness,” 
even if “he does not totally lose his latent vanity.” 
Soellner finds himself uncomfortable with using the term 
anagnorisis to describe this process, even though he 
remains unsure what else to call it. “If we use the 
Aristotelian term,” he decides, “we must redefine it.”53 As 
Nuttall concedes, “Anagnorisis in Aristotle is normally a 
simple recognition of some long-lost person, as it might be 
through signs or tokens.”54 Simon Haines calls it 
“recognition-as-someone-in-particular”: “an unknown [sc. 
person] is suddenly revealed as a known.”55 Richard’s case 
is considerably more complex: more internal, more 
intangible, and more incremental. As Soellner concludes, 
“Richard’s self-search and partial self-finding have moral 
and religious dimensions that Aristotle’s anagnorisis does 
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not have and could not have had.” His “recognitions are 
much less intellectual than is Oedipus’s”; they include “a 
confession of sins.”56 
An example of what Aristotle means by anagnorisis does 
figure prominently in Richard II: York’s discovery, by 
means of an on-stage sign or token, in this case, a letter, 
that his son Aumerle is part of a conspiracy aiming to kill 
Henry IV. The debate that ensues between York and his wife, 
in their pleas before the newly-crowned Bolingbroke, as to 
whether or not their son’s life should be spared re-enacts 
the kind of tension between duty to family and duty to the 
state apparent in Sophocles’ Antigone. But the center of 
Shakespeare’s tragedy is elsewhere: the deposition, 
sometimes called “the mirror scene.” And the culmination of 
this scene is a particular exchange. Richard refuses to 
read out a list of his crimes, calls for a looking-glass, 
looks at himself in it, then shatters it in front of 
Bolingbroke. Why does this moment feel so important?  
“Neither anagnorisis nor Anerkennung,” Haines 
concludes, “seems quite adequate to capture all that 
recognition might increasingly have meant to Shakespeare as 
his thought evolved.”57 One missing element, I would 
suggest, from Haines’s analysis is a Christian one: 
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repentance. Shakespeare puts the decision of key characters 
whether or not to repent at the heart of all of his plays, 
including not only tragedies such as Richard II, but also 
comedies such as Much Ado About Nothing, Twelfth Night, and 
The Merchant of Venice. The suspense that we feel, 
especially if we do not already know the plot, is our 
uncertainty about whether or not the character in question, 
be it Malvolio or Macbeth, will come to his senses, realize 
the error of his ways, and choose to change, before the 
consequences of his persistent yielding to his “tragic 
flaw” become catastrophic. We wait for repentance with 
bated breath, precisely because Shakespeare’s characters 
seem so free to ignore this possibility, if they wish. That 
capacity to balk at the prospect of a change of heart, the 
freedom of a sinner not to acknowledge his own sin, is 
especially apparent here, in this scene. Despite all the 
pressure brought to bear by Northumberland, as well as 
Bolingbroke, Richard point-blank refuses to read out the 
list they hand him of his “grievous crimes” (4.1.223). 
“Must I do so?” he asks. “Must I ravel out / My weaved-up 
follies?” (4.1.228-29).58 As it turns out, he does not. 
Relying on his singular capacity for histrionic 
grandstanding, Richard manages to make such a scene that 
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Bolingbroke relents and lets him leave, instead, the 
“record” of his “offenses” still unread (4.1.230).  
A comic analogue of Richard’s mirror scene appears in 
the next play in the tetralogy; not in a throne room, this 
time, but in a tavern in Eastcheap. Even after Falstaff 
learns that the prince and his companions saw him run away 
at Gad’s Hill, nothing they can say seems able to compel 
him to confess his manifest cowardice. Instead, as Poins 
predicts, he takes refuge in “incomprehensible lies” 
(1.2.176). “Come, tell us,” Hal cries (2.4.226). “What, 
upon compulsion? Zounds,” Falstaff protests, “an I were at 
the strappado, or all the racks in the world, I would not 
tell you on compulsion” (2.4.229-31). Although now in a 
more light-hearted guise, Shakespeare is making the same 
deadly serious point here that he did in Richard’s 
deposition: repentance cannot be forced. The crux of 
Shakespearean drama is our free will, apparent in our 
decision whether or not to be honest with ourselves about 
our own moral character. Internal metanoia of this kind 
cannot be secured by any kind of external “compulsion.”  
As Blair Hoxby observes, “the twentieth century’s most 
influential criticism of tragedy” tends to represent it as 
“either an unavoidable collision of ethical forces or a 
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conflict between freedom and necessity.”59  “An alternative 
vision,” he argues, “may be found in the early modern 
poetics of tragedy,” “the poetics that emerged around 1550 
with the first major commentaries on Aristotle’s Poetics 
and that continued to develop until the 1790s,” when it 
began to be displaced by a new “idealist philosophy of the 
tragic.”60 Nineteenth-century Romantic efforts to 
appropriate Shakespeare as a precedent, a fellow traveler, 
and a rallying cry have proved so influential that they 
tend to be accepted without question, even to this day. Yet 
their claims do not always stand up to scrutiny.61 Hoxby is 
right therefore to question whether Shakespeare’s modus 
operandi in his tragedies does in fact conform to Romantic 
notions of the tragic.62 Unfortunately, however, Hoxby 
nonetheless retains underlying Romantic assumptions about 
Shakespeare’s “secularism” and “supreme indifference to 
moral system”; presuppositions that he presents without 
evidence or further commentary, as if axiomatic.63 What 
Hoxby misses, in other words, in the case of Shakespearean 
tragedy, is the Christian worldview that informs its 
structure. Shakespeare’s tragic method is inseparable from 
his immersion in contemporary Christianity, as mediated 
through sixteenth-century Biblical drama, legally-
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obligatory weekly sermons, and the Bible itself, newly-
translated into English, and as distinct from the influence 
of Aristotelian poetics, as well as classical and 
neoclassical drama. Tragedy for Shakespeare is a sinner’s 
failure to repent.64 Tragedy for Aristotle, as for 
Sophocles, Euripides, and Seneca, is something very 
different. 
“In Shakespeare’s tragedies,” A. C. Bradley writes, 
“we find no trace of fatalism in the more primitive, crude, 
and obvious forms: nothing that makes us think of the 
actions and sufferings of the persons as somehow 
arbitrarily fixed beforehand and without regard to their 
feelings, thoughts, and resolutions.”65 Shakespeare’s strong 
emphasis on the possibility and desirability of repentance 
distinguishes his drama from Senecan tragedy, the most 
influential form of classical tragedy in the England of his 
day, as well as Aristotle’s concept of tragedy, and aligns 
him instead with medieval Biblical drama. What will a given 
individual choose? Will he acknowledge his past sins and 
attempt to reform his behavior? Or will he drift ever 
further towards his own solipsistic self-destruction? As 
Stephen Halliwell observes, Aristotle is “uninterested in 
any such concept of the tragic hero.”66 Shakespeare’s 
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tragedies are closer to morality plays such as Everyman and 
Mankind than they are to Sophocles’ Oedipus. “In the world 
of classical tragedy,” Bruce Smith explains, “larger-than-
life heroes” are “destroyed by external forces.” “In the 
world of the medieval morality plays, on the other hand, 
heroes with the life-size homeliness of Everyman are faced 
with moral choices.”67 Erich Auerbach draws the same 
distinction. In Shakespeare’s plays, “the hero’s character 
is depicted in greater and more varied detail than in 
antique tragedy, and participates more actively in shaping 
the individual’s fate.”68  
Seen from the perspective of literary history, 
Shakespeare’s focus on human moral freedom sets him apart 
from classical precedent. What distinguishes him from 
medieval English drama, in contrast, is his most acclaimed 
quality as a playwright: his “myriad-minded” 
characterization. This capacity to craft plausible, 
distinct individuals is not without an ethical and perhaps 
even theological dimension.  “Why should we suppose it 
proper or valuable,” Bromwich asks, “for the hero himself 
to be edified by the trial through which he passes?” 
Bromwich proposes “two main sources.” One is Aristotle’s 
Poetics. The other is “an intuition derived from 
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psychoanalysis and the high Romantic ideal of self-
consciousness: namely, that there is a profound yet always 
evaded pattern to our thoughts and feelings and actions, a 
pattern which has been repressed and which we must struggle 
to bring to light.” This “Romantic and analytic 
imperative,” he observes, “goes back two hundred years 
now,” and it is “natural,” therefore, that we would look 
for its “confirmation” in Shakespeare, “the writer who is 
widely thought to have originated, as far as a single mind 
can have originated, our conception of individual 
character.”69  
Bromwich’s hypothesis here is not so much incorrect as 
incomplete. He does not go back far enough, back to what 
Isaiah Berlin calls the “roots of Romanticism.”70 
Psychoanalysis likewise, Foucault would say, was not 
invented by Freud, so much as secularized, revised, and 
given a new name.71 Whence arises, more specifically, the 
idea that each individual psyche is distinct and unique? 
What is the nature of this master key, the “pattern” that 
Bromwich describes as “profound yet always evaded”? In his 
seminal study, Shakespearean Tragedy, A. C. Bradley 
describes the tragic hero as defined by what has come to be 
known as a “tragic flaw,” often mislabeled hamartia. “We 
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observe a marked one-sidedness,” he writes; “a 
predisposition in some particular direction; a total 
incapacity, in certain circumstances, of resisting the 
force which draws in this direction; a fatal tendency to 
identify the whole being with one interest, object, 
passion, or habit of mind. This, it would seem, is, for 
Shakespeare, the fundamental tragic trait.”72 The most 
obvious analogue for this “tragic trait,” as Bradley 
describes it, is what Alexander Pope calls a “Ruling 
Passion.”73 “This clue once found,” Pope says, “unravels all 
the rest.”74 Laurence Sterne calls it a “Hobby-Horse”: “When 
a man gives himself up to the government of a ruling 
passion – or, in other words, when his Hobby-Horse grows 
headstrong – farewell cool reason and fair discretion.”75   
Ben Jonson draws upon an analogue and antecedent of 
this way of thinking when he bases some of his stage-
characters on humoral psychology. But there is another 
source, as well, which is less widely-recognized. In 
Hamlet, Hamlet refers to “special providence,” where 
“special” means “specific to an individual.” Likewise, 
early modern English theologians and preachers such as 
William Perkins and Andrew Willet speak of “special sin,” 
meaning what we might now call a “besetting sin,” that is, 
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a bad habit or propensity characteristic of a given 
individual. In his treatise A Riche Storehouse, or 
Treasurie, for the Sicke, Full of Christian Counsels 
(1578), Caspar Huberinus writes, “our Lord God suffereth 
Sathan to trouble & to vexe his, that he doth tempt them 
somtime with some special sinne, and plagueth them 
therewith, whereby they be moued or driuen first to knowe 
themselues, their weake nature & frailtie.”76 In The Reward 
of Religion (1596), Edward Topsell compares the 
distribution of such “special sins” to St. Paul’s 
description of the diverse gifts of the Holy Spirit. “So 
the Lorde leaueth some to bee ouercome by their lustes, 
other by their money, many by their honour, some by their 
office, other by their pride, & euery man hath 
some speciall sinne that raigneth in him aboue other.”77 
Hamlet himself explains the doctrine and connects it to 
more mundane questions of temperament and moral philosophy 
in his speech on what he calls “the vicious mole of nature” 
(1.4.13-38). Over the course of the speech, Hamlet shifts 
from physiological, to ethical, to theological language. 
This “one defect,” he muses, this “particular fault,” 
“breaking down the pales and forts of reason,” could be 
“o’ergrowth of some complexion” (physiological) or “some 
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habit” (ethical). But it could also be “the dram of evil” 
(theological).78  
As Walter Kaufmann points out, “It should be noted how 
very little Aristotle says about hamartia and how little he 
does with it. He uses the term once more, half a dozen 
lines later, then he drops it.” Why then have we made a 
mountain of this molehill? “So unilluminating is 
Aristotle’s doctrine of hamartia as far as Greek tragedy is 
concerned,” Kaufmann argues, “that it would not be the most 
celebrated term in literary criticism if it did not seem to 
work so well with Shakespeare.”79 Part of the attraction, I 
suspect, of the term hamartia is precisely the brevity of 
Aristotle’s presentation. By way of analogy, in his 
treatise De Anima, Aristotle makes a few cryptic remarks 
about the “active intellect.”80 Medieval commentators seized 
on this passage as the basis for amazingly elaborate 
arguments aligning Aristotle with Neo-Platonism, very much 
against the more obvious grain of his thought.81 So, too, 
Aristotle’s elliptical treatment of hamartia has provided 
critics with an opening to Christianize his thought about 
tragedy. As Terence Cave observes, “It is notorious that 
the sense of the word can shift from ‘error’ to ‘fault’, 
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‘flaw’, and other morally loaded terms, and that the shift 
radically affects the conception of tragedy in question.”82  
As Michael Lurie explains, Renaissance humanists went 
to great lengths to try to find a way to blame Oedipus for 
his fate, as part of a larger effort to Christianize 
Aristotle’s Poetics, as well as to assert, by hook or by 
crook, the moral value of pagan tragedy.83 Lurie draws 
particular attention to the influence of Protestant 
humanist Philipp Melanchthon. In his Cohortatio ad legendas 
tragoedias et comoedias, written in 1545, Melanchthon 
defends classical tragedy by arguing that it shows virtue 
rewarded and vice punished: in these plays, he insists, men 
see how “human misfortunes” are “brought about and 
exacerbated by depraved passions.”84 This Cohortatio went 
through eleven editions by the end of the sixteenth 
century; together with his lectures on Sophocles, it was 
much admired and imitated, and it remained a touchstone for 
interpretation of Greek tragedy for the entirety of 
Shakespeare’s lifetime. “Throughout Europe,” Lurie 
recounts, “Sophocles was relentlessly, though not always 
convincingly, subjected to the Christianization initiated 
by Melanchthon.” Meanwhile, Lurie adds, “Aristotle’s 
Poetics underwent a Christianizing and moralizing re-
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interpretation of its own,” “generated by dozens of learned 
commentaries and theoretical treatises written in Italy 
during the second half of the Cinquecento.”85 
 In a forthcoming article, Bryan Brazeau complicates 
Lurie’s history of the Renaissance reception of Aristotle’s 
Poetics. Sixteenth-century commentaries on the Poetics by 
Italian humanists such as Robortello, Maggi, Vettori, and 
Piccolomini do translate hamartia with the Italian word for 
sin, peccato, rather than the more neutral term errore. 
Despite this diction, however, their interpretations of the 
Poetics hew closely to Aristotelian moral philosophy, 
rather than any kind of distinctively Christian ethical 
outlook. Lodovico Castelvetro’s commentary, Poetica 
d’Aristotele vulgarizzata e sposta (1570), which went on to 
be the most influential of his cohort, does introduce a 
thoroughly Christian reading of the Poetics, in which 
hamartia is interpreted as voluntary sin. In Italy, 
however, this Christianizing cast of the mind was the 
exception, rather than the rule. Castelvetro’s departure 
from his Italian contemporaries likely reflects his 
encounter with Protestant interpretations of Greek tragedy 
advanced by German authors such as Melanchthon, whose 
theological treatises Castelvetro had previously translated 
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into Italian.86 In a forthcoming essay, Micha Lazarus, like 
Lurie, draws attention to an edition of Sophocles that came 
out of Wittenberg in the 1530s and 1540s. Lazarus contests 
Lurie’s attribution of the edition to Melanchthon, although 
he grants that the Protestant scholar’s influence is “felt 
in every corner of the volume.” Printed in Frankfurt in 
1547, the volume is dedicated to King Edward VI of England, 
and Lazarus makes a strong case for its influence on 
sixteenth-century English Poetics, including not only 
Christianizing readings of ancient Greek and Latin tragedy, 
but also an efflorescence of new “Scriptural tragedy on a 
classical model,” written in neo-Latin by Protestant 
Reformers.87 
Both Lazarus and Brazeau push back strongly against 
the assumption that Christian appropriation of Aristotle’s 
Poetics by sixteenth-century Protestants should be 
understood as a falling-away from the creative heights of 
pagan antiquity: “‘heavy-handed morality’ that evades 
‘genuinely tragic questions’,” as Lazarus puts it. Brazeau 
objects in particular to Lurie’s dismissive tone. “In spite 
of the value of Lurie’s scholarship, his work is strongly 
polemic; his treatment of sixteenth-century readings of 
Aristotle’s Poetics is entirely in a negative key.”  This 
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approach, Brazeau argues, fails to appreciate the 
“interpretive creativity” characteristic of commentaries 
such as Castelvetro’s, as well as the effects of such 
Christianizing in terms of enabling and inspiring 
contemporary drama, up to and including Shakespeare’s 
tragedies. “Ultimately, religious and moralizing 
interpretations do not seem to have been at odds with the 
goal of poetic efficacy, as tacitly assumed by Weinberg, 
Hathaway, Lurie, and others.”88 “If, for example,” Lazarus 
writes, “someone were to tell me that a certain 
philosophical young Danish prince left Wittenberg for the 
English stage with a head full of Seneca and an 
understanding of tragedy instinct with guilt, judgment, 
confession, sin, the afterlife, purgation, and its 
Christian rewards, I might take a guess at what he had been 
reading.”89 
In fairness to Lurie et al., critical consensus today 
about the meaning of hamartia is strongly opposed to the 
interpretation put forward by Castelvetro, as well as the 
moralizing commentary characteristic of the volume Lazarus 
calls the “Wittenberg Sophocles.” Jan Bremer shows “a 
continuous semantic shift” in the use of hamartia away from 
its original, amoral sense in Homer as simply “missing the 
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mark” towards a denotation of moral error, even as early as 
Plato. By the time of the New Testament, hamartia had 
become the term of choice for “sin.” In Aristotle’s corpus, 
however, Bremer maintains, the word nonetheless retains its 
older, morally neutral meaning: “something like ignorance 
or blunder.”90  As E. R. Dodds observes, “Aristotle was 
using hamartia here as he uses hamartēma in the Nicomachean 
Ethics (1135b12) and in the Rhetoric (1374b6) to mean an 
offence committed in ignorance of some material fact and 
therefore free from ponēria or kakia [villainy or 
wickedness].”91 Gerard Else agrees: “Tragic hamartia is an 
ignorance or mistake as to certain details.”92 Martha 
Nussbaum, too, notes that hamartia as Aristotle uses the 
term is “sharply distinguished from flaw or defect of 
character.” Hamartia in Aristotle’s thought is “also 
distinguished,” however, she adds, “from atuchēma, or a 
mischance that has a purely arbitrary and external origin.” 
“To come to grief through hamartia is, then,” she explains, 
“to fall through some sort of mistake in action that is 
causally intelligible, not simply fortuitous; done in some 
sense by oneself; and yet not the outgrowth of a settled 
defective disposition of character.”93 Kathy Eden suggests 
that Aristotle may have seen hamartia as “the kind of 
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action best suited to the tragic stage,” precisely because 
it “corresponds the category of actions which in the law 
court deserve equity rather than strict justice.” 
Literature is better able than philosophy, perhaps, to 
analyze these kinds of exceptional cases, in which 
intentions, as well as particular circumstances, become the 
pivotal criteria of justice.94 In any case, as Stephen 
Halliwell observes, “modern scholarship has moved 
predominantly toward a much more limited understanding of 
the term than traditional ideas of a ‘tragic flaw’ 
presupposed.”95 Nevertheless, as Else notes, “as so often 
happens, the prevailing conception of hamartia among laymen 
and scholars in other fields is still that of the ‘moral 
flaw,’ which was dominant down through the nineteenth 
century.”96  
Why is a long-discredited misinterpretation of 
Aristotle’s Poetics still so appealing to Shakespeare 
scholars? The attraction, I suspect, is no longer the 
desire to Christianize Aristotle, as it was in the 
sixteenth century. Instead, the aim seems to be to find a 
way to protect and preserve a cherished myth. As Brian 
Cummings recounts in his recent British Academy Shakespeare 
lecture, scholarship on Shakespeare has a long history of 
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bias against the idea that he was seriously and sincerely 
engaged with the religious context of his day.97  If 
Aristotle’s term hamartia is redefined in terms of moral 
culpability, then it allows critics to ground their sense 
of the importance of the “tragic flaw” in Shakespearean 
tragedy in Aristotle’s Poetics, rather than the influence 
of Christianity. The legend of Shakespeare’s secularism is 
preserved, at the cost of distorting Aristotle. 
“Elizabethan drama was almost wholly secular,” A. C. 
Bradley maintains, without pausing even to consider any 
possible objections.98 Nowadays, such a blithe, unsupported 
claim comes across as superficial; uninformed; even 
slightly surreal. Yet the oversight that it represents has 
proved tenacious. As Gerard Kilroy protests, in his review 
of David Kastan’s recent book on Shakespeare and religion, 
A Will to Believe, even if “we cannot know what Shakespeare 
believed,” “we do not have to fashion a poet who would fit 
neatly into a Manhattan dinner party.”99 “If it is not 
plausible to read Shakespeare’s plays as Christian 
allegories,” concedes Deborah Shuger, “neither is it likely 
that the popular drama of a religiously saturated culture 
could, by a secular miracle, have extricated itself from 
the theocentric orientation informing the discourses of 
Gray – 40 
 
politics, gender, social order, and history.”100 Even for 
some scholars still today, however, seeing Shakespeare as 
participating in earnest in his fervently devout context 
can feel counterintuitive. As Cummings explains, “the 
Renaissance as a concept was formulated in strict harmony 
with the theory of secularization”: “the throwing off of 
the domination of religion” Jakob Burckhardt describes in 
his Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. “After 
Burckhardt, Shakespeare became one of the icons of this way 
of explaining cultural history.” His “secularity” came to 
be seen as “a key to his identity and his importance.” More 
broadly speaking, “secularity” served as “a foundation 
stone in the discipline of English.” “Secular humanism was 
central to its self-exposition as the modernist university 
discipline.” To describe Shakespearean tragedy as 
structurally Christian upsets this familiar narrative. 
Shakespeare is too central to the canon; too normative; too 
useful as a standard-bearer. Critics sympathetic to the 
secularization thesis want to preserve Shakespeare’s status 
as a harbinger of modernity, understood as freedom from 
traditional religion; Shakespeare is for them a herald of a 
secular age which somehow, even today, still remains just 
over the horizon.101  
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How are we to “think about Shakespeare,” Cummings 
asks, “without secularization”? If what we have been 
calling anagnorisis in his plays can be better understood 
as repentance, and what we have been calling hamartia as 
besetting sin, what about the third feature of the 
Aristotelian tragic plot, peripeteia? In his Poetics, 
Aristotle argues that the best kind of anagnorisis 
coincides with a reversal: peripeteia. The unexpected 
answer to the question, “whodunit?” should be revealed, as 
in the case of Oedipus, at the very moment that the floor 
falls out from underneath the hero’s hopes for the future. 
Here again, Austen proves paradigmatic: for overconfident 
heroines such as Emma, the anagnorisis is itself the 
peripeteia. Subjectively, at least, if not objectively, the 
news of the betrayal is itself the bouleversement. The 
discovery is the reversal: a masterstroke of creative 
economy.102 Aristotle’s own perspective here is 
disconcertingly amoral: he admires the aesthetic unity 
achieved by combining these two elements of the plot, 
recognition and reversal, much as a connoisseur of poetry 
might prefer Homer’s Iliad to less focused, episodic epics 
such as the (now-lost) Heracleid or Theseid (1451a20-21). 
Bromwich finds the passage, nonetheless, an occasion to 
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consider a deeper ethical truth. “We know from experience 
that a deeply unsettling and shocking reversal is often the 
only thing that can precipitate any self-recognition at all 
in a person of strong will.”103 As far as human nature, 
Bromwich’s point seems sound. What Bromwich means by “self-
recognition,” however, is very far from what Aristotle 
means by anagnorisis. I imagine Shakespeare, moreover, 
would want to factor in another element, a necessary 
catalyst: the intersubjective process Cavell calls 
“acknowledgment,” and St. Augustine, “confession.”  
A reversal of fortune, however calamitous it may seem, 
is not enough on its own to guarantee repentance. In 
addition, the character must receive and accept corrective 
feedback from other people. Peripeteia can be helpful to 
that end: as we know from celebrity scandals, people who 
have not experienced considerable failure and 
disappointment are not usually inclined to see themselves 
as standing in need of ethical advice. Instead, they are 
prone to what Homer would call atē: the delusions of 
grandeur attendant upon overweening pride. Everyman must be 
summoned by Death, before he can be convinced to reconsider 
the value that he sets on worldly wealth. Saul must be 
blinded and knocked off his horse, before God can persuade 
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him to stop persecuting Christians. In his 1978 Harvard 
commencement address, Alexandr Solzhenitsyn vividly 
describes the shock that he felt as a dissident from the 
Soviet Union arriving into exile in the West. There is “a 
self-deluding interpretation of the contemporary world 
situation,” he recounts discovering, which “works as a sort 
of a petrified armor around people's minds.” “Human voices 
from 17 countries of Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia cannot 
pierce it. It will only be broken by the pitiless crowbar 
of events.”104 
But is a catastrophe necessarily enough to secure a 
change of heart? As Will Hamlin observes, in Shakespeare’s 
plays, conscience is usually stirred to life, not by 
external events, but more immediately by some other person, 
a character whom Hamlin describes as a “god-surrogate.” “At 
times,” he explains, “conscience requires provocation; it 
needs to be nudged.”105  Examples he adduces include the 
Countess in All’s Well that Ends Well confronting Helen 
about her love for Bertram, as well as Hamlet’s speech to 
Gertrude about her marriage to Claudius. Another he does 
not mention is Marina in Pericles, when she is held captive 
in the brothel and by her preaching and virtuous presence 
converts her would-be clients to lives of chastity. “She 
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would make a puritan of the devil,” the Bawd complains 
(4.6.17). More complex examples include Hamlet’s Mousetrap, 
as well as the show that Prospero has Ariel put on for the 
“three men of sin” in The Tempest (3.3.53), snatching away 
their supposed banquet and rebuking them in the likeness of 
a harpy.  
The most complicated such efforts, however, to evoke 
the pangs of conscience are the machinations of the Duke in 
Measure for Measure. “The entire early plot” of this 
“problem play,” Hamlin proposes, can be understood as a 
kind of Mousetrap for Angelo: “a play-within-a-play 
conceived on a significantly larger scale than that even in 
Hamlet.” Prospero says of his enemies that his whole 
“project” consists in their “being penitent” (5.1.28): 
“heart-sorrow / And a clear life ensuing” (3.3.81-2). The 
Duke’s “project” here seems to be much the same. His 
multifarious schemes aim to inspire repentance not only in 
his deputy, Angelo, but also in almost all of the other 
major characters: Claudio; Juliet; Pompey; even (arguably) 
Isabella. As they strive to persuade other characters to 
repent, characters such as the Duke in Measure for Measure, 
Helena in All’s Well that Ends Well, and Prospero in The 
Tempest can easily seem to be ‘playing God’, making it 
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difficult for a present-day audience to find them 
sympathetic. Hamlin suggests that this impression of 
“encroaching upon divine prerogative” may perhaps be 
“usefully reconceived” as their adhering to a “culturally-
sanctioned script.” They are second-hand agents of the 
divine, calling sinners to judgment through “the deployment 
of mimetic representations of truth.”106  
As we soon find out, however, an encounter with what 
Hamlin calls a “god-surrogate” does not guarantee 
repentance; no more so than a reversal of fortune. Angelo, 
Antonio, Bertram: do these characters ever entirely repent? 
Shakespeare leaves their final state of mind ambiguous. 
John of Gaunt’s incisive rebuke of Richard II, early in the 
play, seems to make no impression on the petulant young 
monarch other than to prompt him to insults and 
recrimination. As York warns Gaunt beforehand, “all in vain 
comes counsel to his ear” (2.1.4). Later on, Richard leaves 
the deposition hardly less defiant. Yet he is perhaps not 
altogether impervious, in the end, to the gaze of the 
other. As I argue elsewhere, Shakespeare seems to see other 
people as able to interpellate the self, at least to some 
extent.107 Even the disapproving glance of a stranger can 
induce misgivings; doubts; a shiver of uncertainty about 
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one’s own private, more flattering self-definition. As 
Christopher Tilmouth notes, for Shakespeare, conscience 
“constructs itself as another human’s presence invading the 
mind.” “It is under that party’s gaze, according to his 
judgment, that man then feels his conduct being evaluated.” 
108  
If a single gaze can prove so powerful, all the more 
so a great crowd of spectators: hence Cleopatra’s horror, 
as well as Brutus’s, at the thought of being led in 
triumph. After being led in disgrace through the streets of 
London, Richard arrives before his wife a changed man. 
“What,” she says, alarmed, “is my Richard both in shape and 
mind / Transformed and weakened?” (5.1.26-27) In speaking 
with her, Richard begins to regain, however, some of his 
former self-serving dissociation. Encouraged by her praise, 
he imagines a different audience, “good old folks” more 
sympathetic than the jeering former subjects he has just 
passed by. He muses on the thought of these “hearers 
weeping” at his “lamentable tale,” “the deposing of a 
rightful king” (5.1.40-50). Heartened by this consoling 
fantasy, he begins to seem a bit more like his former 
grandiose self.  
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Soellner is surely right when he says Richard’s “self-
discoveries” are “dispersed”: “Richard does not achieve a 
particular culminating discovery comparable to the full and 
devastating disclosure Oedipus receives of his true 
situation.”109 Nonetheless, in his final scene, imprisoned 
at Pomfret, Richard does engage in a few moments of soul-
searching self-reproach. A musician he hears outside is 
off-rhythm; “keep time!” he complains. “How sour sweet 
music is / When time is broke and no proportion kept” 
(5.5.42). Then he catches himself. 
 
 here have I the daintiness of ear 
To check time broke in a disordered string, 
But for the concord of my state and time 
Had not an ear to hear my true time broke. 
I wasted time, and now doth Time waste me. (5.5.45-49) 
 
What Richard realizes here in his reflections on “time” is 
what a phenomenologist might call the “givenness” of 
external reality.110 No matter how lively or imaginative our 
internal subjectivity might be, it is not a viable, 
sustainable alternative to the more objective world 
outside. We cannot escape altogether into our own 
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fantasies; “time,” at least, will still come calling, even 
inside Hamlet’s “nutshell” or Richard’s own “hollow crown.” 
What starts as a play on words thus becomes serious; 
Richard emerges, as it were, from the bubble of his 
solipsism. And as if on cue, he starts to notice other 
people. He becomes thankful for the music: “blessing on his 
heart that gives it me,” he concludes, “For ‘tis a sign of 
love” (5.5.64-65). A “Groom of the Stable” enters, hailing 
Richard as “royal Prince,” and Richard’s reply is 
remarkable: “Thanks, noble peer” (5.5.67). 
 Cavell’s analysis of King Lear sheds some light on the 
importance of these two brief exchanges. Cavell proposes 
that Lear’s persistent “avoidance of love” reflects his 
desire “to avoid recognition, the shame of exposure, the 
threat of self-revelation.”111 Coriolanus as Cavell sees him 
is a variation on the same pattern: he is not willing to 
accept compliments, because he does not want to admit to 
himself that he is in any sense dependent on other people. 
Richard’s gratitude, by this light, for the music played in 
his honor is both an effect and a reward of his repentance. 
In becoming more honest with himself about his own nature, 
he discovers that he is able to participate in “love.” 
Richard’s change of heart, in other words, such as it is, 
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coincides with a newfound respect and appreciation for 
these two lower-class well-wishers, the off-stage musician 
and the on-stage stablehand. A similar moment occurs in 
King Lear, when, as Lear says, his “wits begin to turn” 
(3.2.67). “How dost my boy?” he asks the Fool. “Art cold? / 
I am cold myself” (3.2.68-69). His incipient recognition 
that he himself might be morally flawed, “sinning” as well 
as “sinned against” (3.2.59), coincides with a more 
grounded awareness of his relation to another human being, 
a pathetic figure who until then had been the object of his 
scorn and anger. Recognition and repentance enable and 
reinforce each other; self-knowledge and acknowledgment 
turn out to be inseparable.112 
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